A public status dashboard let attackers in. The keys sitting in users’ home folders could let them go much further.

On 16 November, RIKEN published a notice that Fugaku, Japan’s flagship supercomputer, had been broken into. Fugaku, jointly developed by RIKEN and Fujitsu, was the world’s fastest when it began full operations in March 2021, and it runs simulations for science and for industrial and military technology, Kyodo News notes.

The line I keep rereading is further down. Among the files taken, or possibly taken, from users’ home directories were credentials those users had saved to connect to supercomputers and services outside RIKEN: SSH private keys and access keys. RIKEN also confirmed the attacker had already tried to use some of them to connect to other systems.

That is the part of this story that travels.

What happened, briefly

According to RIKEN’s notice (also posted by its Center for Computational Science):

  • Between 10 and 13 November, an outside party got into Fugaku’s internal operations network. The foothold was a web dashboard, published on the internet, that showed Fugaku’s operating status. The exact method is still under investigation.

  • The intruder operated multiple internal servers and planted malicious programs on some.

  • Part of the files in users’ home directories, plus names, email addresses and user IDs from the user authentication system, were taken or may have been taken. That covers up to 4,597 people: up to 4,222 Fugaku users and up to 375 users of Rikyu (理究), RIKEN’s AI-for-science supercomputer.

  • RIKEN says it has found no concrete sign that research results leaked. Nikkei xTECH points out that companies can pay to use Fugaku without publishing their results; RIKEN told the paper that possible leakage of such non-public results is “being checked.”

A password opens one door. A stored key opens many.

SSH (Secure Shell) is the standard way researchers and administrators log in to remote Linux and Unix machines. An SSH key comes in two halves. The public half sits on the server you want to reach, and it is safe to share. The private half is a small file that proves you are you. Whoever holds that file can log in as you, usually with no password prompt and no MFA (multi-factor authentication, the second check such as a phone code).

The OpenSSH manual says it plainly: if somebody steals the key, it “permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world,” unless you have limited where it can be used from.

So a private key saved in your Fugaku home folder to reach a university cluster or cloud account is a copy of your house key left in someone else’s building. When that building is broken into, your house is next. One breach becomes a launchpad into other supercomputers on HPCI (High Performance Computing Infrastructure, Japan’s shared national research computing network), into universities, into cloud accounts. RIKEN has already seen attempts.

Why nobody sees the keys walk out

Keys don’t expire unless you make them. They aren’t covered by MFA by default. And they are missing from most asset inventories.

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) put it bluntly in its guidance on SSH access management: “Many organizations don’t even know how many SSH keys they have configured to grant access to their information systems or who has copies of those keys.” The same document warns that key-based trust lets an attacker who compromises one system “quickly move (or pivot) from one system to another.” That was 2015.

Try five questions on your own team. How many keys and tokens exist? Where do they live? What does each one open? Who owns it? When was it last rotated? If that takes more than a day to answer, you likely carry the same exposure.

The harmless dashboard, and the contractor

The way in was a status page, the kind of thing everyone assumes is harmless. But it sat on the open internet, and it became the stepping stone into the network that runs the machine.

In 2023 the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) ordered federal agencies to pull management interfaces off the public internet or put them behind separate access controls. Status dashboards deserve the same treatment.

RIKEN also states that maintenance of the system is outsourced to a contractor, and says it will review the division of roles. That pattern is now verifiable in the data. My Japan Cybersecurity Tracker logs 1,641 publicly disclosed incidents in Japan from 1 June to 16 November 2026, and 1,034 of 1,641 (63.0%) came through a vendor.

Email delivery service Arara Message is a large recent example: 81,329,467 email addresses taken, and, per Arara’s own update, up to about 7.13 million fake credit-card-company emails sent through the platform from 28 to 30 October. Arara’s third report adds that one cloud environment was entered using misused credentials. Keys again.

Credit where it’s due

RIKEN spotted this within days. It isolated the system on 13 November, shut Fugaku down early on 14 November, rotated its administrative keys that evening, invalidated every user’s login key and stopped all jobs on 15 November, and told users to revoke stored credentials at every destination. It reported to MEXT (Japan’s science ministry), HPCI partners and the PPC (Personal Information Protection Commission), and published a detailed timeline three days after confirming the intrusion. That is harder than it looks.

A checklist that cuts risk and work

  1. Inventory every key and token. Where it lives, what it opens, who owns it, when it was last changed.

  2. Stop storing credentials for system B on system A. Shared servers are the worst place for private keys.

  3. Protect private keys. Use a passphrase at minimum; better, hardware-backed keys (a USB security key or the computer’s TPM, its built-in security chip) and an SSH agent, so the key never sits as a copyable file.

  4. Prefer short-lived certificates. An SSH certificate authority (CA) issues access that expires on its own after a set period, such as one working day, instead of keys that live forever.

  5. Scope and fence. One key, one purpose, usable only from known addresses.

  6. Rotate on a schedule, and revoke after any incident, including other people’s incidents.

  7. Take status pages and admin dashboards off the open internet, or put them behind authentication.

  8. Segment. A dashboard should have no route to the operations network.

  9. Review every vendor. Keep the necessary ones, bring the rest in-house or drop them, and write down who owns what.

The aim is fewer weak points in systems people can still use. Fewer keys, fewer vendors and clear ownership mean less to track, lower cost and fewer late-night fires. Knowing your own systems well is also a signal of trust to the people who rely on them.

If you used Fugaku or Rikyu, or any shared research system

  • Revoke and reissue every key or token you stored there, at each service it opens.

  • Check login and authentication logs at those destinations from 10 November onward.

  • Watch for phishing that impersonates RIKEN or Fugaku. RIKEN says it never asks for passwords by email.

If you need any help, don’t hesitate to get in touch.

Matt Ketchum