Matt Ketchum, MKUltraman · Scope: incidents disclosed 1–30 June 2026 · Data as of 16 November 2026 · Source: the Japan Cybersecurity Tracker
Written in November 2026 from tracker data and dated to the period it covers. It was not published at the time.
The 30-second briefing
Key facts. Organisations in Japan published 83 breach notices in June 2026, the first month the tracker covers. Those notices trace back to about 53 distinct breaches. 32 of 83 (38.6%) of the notices came from organisations hit through a supplier, and three supplier breaches produced 33 of 83 (39.8%). Where a notice gave a figure, the headline numbers add up to about 14.4 million, and KDDI’s mail platform for internet providers accounts for nearly all of it.
Who should act. Anyone who sends newsletters through an outside mail service, schools and local governments that sell photos or run sites through contractors, and anyone with a mailbox at an internet provider. 12 of 17 (70.6%) government notices came through a supplier.
One first action. Check every mailbox for automatic forwarding rules nobody remembers setting, and turn off forwarding to outside addresses by default.
Biggest uncertainty. How attackers got in. 24 of 53 (45.3%) of the distinct breaches do not say.
Posture
June looks quiet next to October, and it was. But the shape is already there: a handful of supplier breaches copied into a dozen customer notices each, on top of a steady run of organisations breached in their own systems, ransomware above all. Nobody needs to panic about June. It is worth reading as the baseline, because Japan’s heavy use of outside contractors is now verifiable in the data from the very first month.
The count
83 notices were disclosed between 1 and 30 June. The tracker starts on 1 June 2026, so there is no earlier month in it to compare with. The weeks below show the pace building through the month, with the last full week the busiest.
| Week | Notices | Through a supplier | Own systems | Supplier’s own notice | Unclear |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1–7 Jun | 10 | 0 of 10 (0.0%) | 9 | 1 | 0 |
| 8–14 Jun | 16 | 10 of 16 (62.5%) | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 15–21 Jun | 20 | 6 of 20 (30.0%) | 13 | 1 | 0 |
| 22–28 Jun | 29 | 16 of 29 (55.2%) | 12 | 1 | 0 |
| 29–30 Jun | 8 | 0 of 8 (0.0%) | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| June | 83 | 32 of 83 (38.6%) | 48 | 3 | 0 |
Weeks run Monday to Sunday and are cut at the month’s edges. “Own systems” means the organisation’s own systems were breached. “Supplier’s own notice” is a supplier announcing its own breach.
The jump in the week of 22 June is two supplier breaches landing at once: KDDI’s mail platform for internet providers and a newsletter-delivery service, which between them produced 16 notices that week.
Notices vs distinct breaches
When one supplier is breached, every customer that publishes counts as a notice, but it is still one breach. To count breaches, I collapsed every notice linked to a named supplier into that supplier’s breach, and counted each own-system incident once.
About 53 distinct breaches produced the 83 June notices. Four named supplier breaches account for 34 notices. 48 were breaches of the organisation’s own systems, and one came through a supplier the notice does not name. That one is counted once, so 53 is an upper bound.
3 of 4 (75.0%) of the named supplier breaches produced more than one notice. All four were:
| Supplier breach | What it does | June notices | Share of 83 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meruhai-kun (Delightful) | Bulk email and newsletter delivery | 13 | 13 of 83 (15.7%) |
| Hai Cheese! Photo (Sen Corp) | Photo sales for schools and kindergartens | 12 | 12 of 83 (14.5%) |
| KDDI (ISP mail system) | Mail system KDDI runs for several internet providers | 8 | 8 of 83 (9.6%) |
| YCC Information System | IT systems for local-government bodies | 1 | 1 of 83 (1.2%) |
Counts include the supplier’s own notice where it published one.
Three supplier breaches made up 39.8% of the month’s notices. Bulk messaging is already on the list in June, four months before Blastmail, Arcadia, Cuenote FC and Arara Message turned it into the story of the autumn.
Through a supplier
32 of 83 (38.6%) notices came from organisations hit through a supplier, and another 3 were suppliers announcing their own breach. Of the 32, 30 name the supplier, one is inferred from the service described and one does not name it.
The public sector leans hardest on suppliers. 12 of 17 (70.6%) government notices came through one, mostly schools and kindergartens whose photo-sales service was breached, plus one city newsletter. Everything else came through an organisation’s own systems.
Notable cases
- KDDI disclosed on 23 June that the mail system it runs for internet providers had been breached, with up to 14.22 million mailboxes exposed and 12,231,954 addresses and 7,616,173 mail passwords or password hashes confirmed leaked. The cause was a flaw in third-party software, with access from 16 May. Seven providers that use the platform published their own notices.
- Hai Cheese! Photo, a photo-sales service for schools and kindergartens, was breached through a software flaw overnight on 4–5 June. Purchasers’ names, addresses and phone numbers, plus school names, were exposed, and the company withheld the count. Eleven schools, wards and cities published their own notices.
- Meruhai-kun, a newsletter-delivery service, found intruders on some servers on 15 June. Subscriber names and email addresses held for its customers were at risk, and 12 customers published notices, including Sado City with 4,111 addresses.
- Fujikura Composites found a malicious automatic forwarding rule on one mailbox on 8 June. The notice says the rule dated from 31 July 2020, which means one inbox had been quietly copying mail out for almost six years.
- Softsu lost 159,850 phone numbers, call times and transcription text from a test server. Test systems with real data in them keep turning up in notices.
- Ransomware hit 13 organisations, 12 in their own systems and one through an unnamed fax-service supplier. They include Hands Holdings, Musashino University, a Taiwan subsidiary of Nidec and a research terminal at Kyushu University Hospital.
- Three schools, Wakayama, Seijo and Oita, reported the same kind of flaw in virtual campus-tour pages being used to redirect visitors elsewhere. No data leaked, but it shows one weak plugin turning up in several places in the same fortnight.
How attackers got in
The route is stated for 29 of 53 (54.7%) of the month’s distinct breaches. 24 of 53 (45.3%) say “unauthorized access” and nothing more. The shares below use only the 29 that state a route, so treat them as a sketch.
| Route, in plain English | Distinct breaches | Closest MITRE ATT&CK technique |
|---|---|---|
| Ransomware: files encrypted, often with data taken first | 13 of 29 (44.8%) | Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486), which describes the damage, not the way in |
| Misused account: stolen or guessed passwords, hijacked email or admin accounts | 9 of 29 (31.0%) | Valid Accounts (T1078) |
| Flaw in an internet-facing system or app: an unpatched or vulnerable website, server, plugin or programming interface (API) | 5 of 29 (17.2%) | Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) |
| Other: malware on a contractor’s computer, payment fraud, supplier outages | 2 of 29 (6.9%) | Varies |
MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of attacker techniques that security teams use as a shared vocabulary. Supplier breaches take the route stated in the supplier’s own notice.
Ransomware leads June among stated routes. By notices, though, the two flaws at the photo-sales service and KDDI’s mail platform produced 20 notices between them. A single unpatched component at a supplier travels further than any one ransomware case.
What’s affected
61 of 83 (73.5%) notices list at least one type of data. The shares below use those 61 as the base.
| Data type | Notices | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Email addresses | 28 | 28 of 61 (45.9%) |
| Names | 32 | 32 of 61 (52.5%) |
| Phone numbers | 21 | 21 of 61 (34.4%) |
| Postal addresses | 22 | 22 of 61 (36.1%) |
| Date of birth | 4 | 4 of 61 (6.6%) |
| Passwords (hashed or not) | 9 | 9 of 61 (14.8%) |
| Payment card data (including partial numbers) | 1 | 1 of 61 (1.6%) |
Data types are matched on the wording of each notice, and a notice that says “no card data” is not counted as card data. Passwords use the tracker’s own password flag.
Names, addresses and email addresses lead, which is what photo orders and mailing lists contain. The password share is low by count but large by volume: the mail platform alone put millions of mail passwords or hashes in play, and mail passwords are often reused elsewhere.
Records
June’s deduplicated total is 14,440,869. Notices whose figures already sit inside a supplier’s own total are left out: 30 of 83 (36.1%). That way each supplier breach counts once. Of the 53 that remain, 16 of 53 (30.2%) give a number.
The unit is the catch. Notices count email addresses, people, accounts or simply “records”, and the same person can appear in many of them. Read this as the sum of headline figures, not as a count of people.
| Unit stated | Records | Share of total |
|---|---|---|
| Accounts (mostly mailboxes) | 14,222,503 | 98.5% |
| Records, unit unspecified | 175,194 | 1.2% |
| Mixed units | 35,953 | 0.2% |
| Email addresses | 3,945 | 0.0% |
| People | 3,274 | 0.0% |
One breach carries the month. KDDI’s 14,220,000 mailboxes are 98.5% of the total. Take it out and June adds up to about 221,000. The median notice with a figure is 1,208.
| Organisation | Headline figure | Breached |
|---|---|---|
| KDDI (ISP mail system) | 14,220,000 mailboxes | Supplier’s own systems |
| Softsu | 159,850 phone numbers with call records | Own systems |
| Saga Hirakawaya (online shop) | 35,953 records, mixed units | Own systems |
| Visual Arts | 13,500 records | Own systems |
| en Japan (job site) | 2,503 accounts | Own systems |
Figures that providers published for their own share of the mail-platform breach, such as 5,016,432 addresses at one and 2,591,943 at another, sit inside the platform’s total and are not added again.
Disclosure speed
Only notices with an exact discovery date and an exact disclosure date are used: 13 of 83 (15.7%). Discovery here means when the organisation says it found out, which for a supplier’s customer is often when the supplier told it.
| Group | Notices with both dates | Median days, discovery to disclosure | Disclosed within 7 days |
|---|---|---|---|
| All | 13 | 7 | 7 of 13 (53.8%) |
| Own systems | 12 | 7.5 | 6 of 12 (50.0%) |
| Through a supplier | 0 | – | – |
| Supplier’s own notice | 1 | 4 | 1 of 1 (100.0%) |
The sample is small, so read this loosely. No June notice was published on the day of discovery and none took more than 30 days. The slowest was 27 days. None of the supplier customers gave an exact discovery date, so that row is empty.
Finding out is the slow part. The forwarding rule at Fujikura Composites sat for almost six years, and the mail platform’s exposure began about five weeks before anyone published.
Sectors two ways
Counting notices and counting breaches give different pictures. The second column counts breaches of the organisation’s own systems, including suppliers that announced breaches of their own systems (51 in June).
| Sector | Notices | Own-system breaches |
|---|---|---|
| Government / public sector | 17 of 83 (20.5%) | 5 of 51 (9.8%) |
| IT / internet / software services | 16 of 83 (19.3%) | 8 of 51 (15.7%) |
| Other | 14 of 83 (16.9%) | 8 of 51 (15.7%) |
| Retail / e-commerce | 9 of 83 (10.8%) | 9 of 51 (17.6%) |
| Education / research | 9 of 83 (10.8%) | 5 of 51 (9.8%) |
| Manufacturing / construction / utilities | 8 of 83 (9.6%) | 7 of 51 (13.7%) |
| Healthcare / pharma | 5 of 83 (6.0%) | 4 of 51 (7.8%) |
| Media / entertainment | 4 of 83 (4.8%) | 4 of 51 (7.8%) |
| Finance / insurance | 1 of 83 (1.2%) | 1 of 51 (2.0%) |
Government tops the notice count with 17 of 83 (20.5%), and 12 of 17 (70.6%) of those came through a supplier. IT and internet companies come next, and 8 of 16 (50.0%) of their notices are the mail platform and the providers that rent it. Retail’s 9 of 51 (17.6%) own-system breaches are a mix of online shops, ransomware at retailers, hijacked mail and one fake-executive payment request.
Outside counts
Other counts use different rules and should not be added to the tracker’s. The Personal Information Protection Commission (PPC) received 185 initial reports of personal-data leaks from unauthorized access in June, up from 163 in May. The PPC notes that a client and its contractor may both report the same event, and that reports from financial and telecom firms and from public bodies are not included.
Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR), which counts only listed companies and their subsidiaries, says its monthly count stayed in the teens until September.
One practical tip
Check every mailbox for forwarding rules, and block automatic forwarding to outside addresses unless someone asks for it and a named person approves it. It takes an afternoon in most mail systems, and it closes the gap that let one mailbox leak for nearly six years.
If your mail provider tells you a password leaked, change it, and change it anywhere else it was reused. A password manager makes that a five-minute job rather than a weekend.
30, 60 and 90 days
Review every supplier that touches personal data. Keep the ones that are necessary, and bring the rest in-house or drop them. Fewer suppliers means fewer places for data to leak, fewer logins and contracts to manage, and fewer notices to write: operational efficiency as well as lower risk.
| When | Action | Owner | Done when |
|---|---|---|---|
| 30 days | List every outside service that sends mail or holds contact lists for you, with a named internal owner for each. | Head of IT or security, with procurement | One list, each line with the data it holds and an owner. |
| 60 days | Decide keep, bring in-house or drop for each. Delete old mailing lists and order data you no longer need, at the supplier and at home. | Business owners, with legal | Each supplier has a decision and a date; deletion confirmed in writing. |
| 90 days | Turn on phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA), such as passkeys or hardware security keys, for mail admin and supplier-portal accounts, and block outside forwarding by default. | IT operations | Admin accounts covered; forwarding exceptions listed with an end date. |
What remains unknown
- How most attackers got in. 24 of 53 breaches (45.3%) do not say.
- How many people were really affected. Units are mixed, and 37 of the 53 counted notices (69.8%) give no number.
- Who has not published. Organisations that stayed silent are not counted, so every figure here is a floor.
- How complete June is. These rows were added later, so small notices may be missing.
How we counted
Each row of the Japan Cybersecurity Tracker is one organisation’s published notice about a cyber incident in Japan. This briefing uses rows whose disclosure date falls between 1 and 30 June 2026, from the snapshot of 16 November 2026. The June to September rows were mostly added after the fact, in a backfill, so small notices that never reached the press are more likely to be missing than in later months.
- Included: incidents disclosed by the organisation itself, or a supplier’s notice confirmed by the customer’s own notice. Hijacked email and admin accounts count even when no leak is confirmed.
- Not included: ransomware gangs’ claims on the dark web without a notice, lost USB sticks and other physical losses, and precautionary shutdowns with no incident.
- “No leak confirmed” is recorded as stated. It is not read as “no leak”.
- Supplier links: of the 32 notices through a supplier, 30 (93.8%) name the supplier, 1 (3.1%) is inferred from the service described and 1 (3.1%) does not name one.
- Distinct breaches: notices are collapsed to the parent breached supplier named in the data. Own-system incidents and unnamed-supplier notices count one each, so the distinct count is an upper bound.
- Records: the headline or maximum figure each notice gives, including later revisions. Blank stays blank, not zero. Figures already inside a supplier’s total are excluded from the sum.
- Dates: notices are placed by disclosure date. 13 tracker rows have no exact disclosure date. None of them is placed in this month, and they are left out of every monthly figure.
- Limits: categories come from the wording of notices, much of it translated from Japanese. The data is a snapshot and changes as reports are revised.
The full row-level dataset is available on request through the dataset page, which also explains the method and how to cite it.
If you need any help, don’t hesitate to get in touch.
Matt Ketchum