Japan’s July 2026 breaches: a briefing

Matt Ketchum, MKUltraman · Scope: incidents disclosed 1–31 July 2026 · Data as of 16 November 2026 · Source: the Japan Cybersecurity Tracker

Written in November 2026 from tracker data and dated to the period it covers. It was not published at the time.

The 30-second briefing

Key facts. Organisations in Japan published 72 breach notices in July 2026, 11 fewer than June’s 83. They trace back to about 56 distinct breaches. 24 of 72 (33.3%) notices came from organisations hit through a supplier, and one supplier, a student-PC shop used by universities, produced 14 of 72 (19.4%). Where a notice gave a figure, the headline numbers add up to about 41.6 million, and a single booking-system breach makes up 79.4% of that.

Who should act. Universities and schools that send students to an outside shop, anyone whose bookings or customer records sit with a platform, and anyone who has ever changed supplier without asking what happened to the old data. Education produced 18 of 72 (25.0%) notices.

One first action. When you stop using a supplier, get written confirmation that it has deleted your data, and keep that letter.

Biggest uncertainty. How attackers got in. 35 of 56 (62.5%) of the distinct breaches do not say.

Posture

July was a little quieter than June by count and much bigger by volume. Two things stand out. One supplier breach reached 12 schools and universities in a little over two weeks, and several notices concerned suppliers the organisation had stopped using years earlier, but whose copies of its data were still there. Contractor reliance is now verifiable in the data, and so is the long tail of data left behind with former contractors.

The count

72 notices were disclosed between 1 and 31 July, down 11 from June’s 83 (13.3% fewer). The first five days were the busiest by daily rate, and 8 of 14 (57.1%) of those notices were the student-PC shop and its customers.

Week Notices Through a supplier Own systems Supplier’s own notice Unclear
1–5 Jul 14 8 of 14 (57.1%) 4 2 0
6–12 Jul 19 8 of 19 (42.1%) 11 0 0
13–19 Jul 17 5 of 17 (29.4%) 10 2 0
20–26 Jul 12 1 of 12 (8.3%) 10 1 0
27–31 Jul 10 2 of 10 (20.0%) 7 1 0
July 72 24 of 72 (33.3%) 42 6 0

Weeks run Monday to Sunday and are cut at the month’s edges. “Own systems” means the organisation’s own systems were breached. “Supplier’s own notice” is a supplier announcing its own breach.

After a slow first few days, own-system notices held at 7 to 11 a week. The supplier column did the moving.

Notices vs distinct breaches

When one supplier is breached, every customer that publishes counts as a notice, but it is still one breach. To count breaches, I collapsed every notice linked to a named supplier into that supplier’s breach, and counted each own-system incident once.

About 56 distinct breaches produced the 72 July notices. Eleven named supplier breaches account for 27 notices. 42 were breaches of the organisation’s own systems, and 3 came through a supplier the notice does not name. Those 3 are counted one each, so 56 is an upper bound.

Most supplier breaches were small: 7 of 11 (63.6%) produced a single notice. One did not.

Supplier breach What it does July notices Share of 72
Kaga Solnet (Academico Navi) Online shop selling PCs to university students 14 14 of 72 (19.4%)
Ainex (Asahi Broadcasting group) Group IT company holding broadcaster data 2 2 of 72 (2.8%)
Nichirei (logistics) Food logistics 2 2 of 72 (2.8%)
YCC Information System IT systems for local-government bodies 2 2 of 72 (2.8%)

Counts include the supplier’s own notice where it published one.

Kaga Solnet alone made up 19.4% of the month’s notices, 12 of them from schools and universities that had pointed students at its site, and one from a bookseller that sold through it.

Through a supplier

24 of 72 (33.3%) notices came from organisations hit through a supplier, and another 6 were suppliers announcing their own breach. Of the 24, 21 (87.5%) name the supplier and 3 (12.5%) do not.

All 4 government notices (100.0%) came through a supplier: a school using the student-PC shop, a town library and a staff retirement-allowance association using the same local IT company, and a Tokyo business-support body whose website operator was breached.

July also shows how far back a supplier link can reach:

  • Lind Sports reported 3,075 customer records from 2014 exposed when its former fax-service supplier was hit by ransomware.
  • Murata Land & Building, a property company in the Murata group, reported that motor-insurance policyholder data was exposed in an intrusion at its parent’s IT environment. It found out on 28 February and published on 10 July.
  • Fukuoka University’s 33,668 affected people came through Nostrum, the company behind its SMART SPI exam-prep service. The intrusion dates from April.

Notable cases

  • Kaga Solnet disclosed on 1 July that its Academico Navi shop, which sells PCs to university students, had been breached. 165,587 people’s names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses and encrypted passwords were affected, and 12 schools and universities, plus a bookseller, published their own notices by 17 July.
  • EPARK Relax & Esthe disclosed on 31 July a breach of PeakManager, the booking and customer system it runs for salons and clinics: about 33 million records (22.18 million people), including dates of birth and encrypted passwords. One customer, Factory Japan Group, published its own notice in August.
  • Murauchi.com, an electronics retailer, reported 7,716,811 records after an intrusion in the early hours of 15 July. It found out the next day and published on 24 July.
  • Nihon Kotsu, the Tokyo taxi company, reported an intrusion into internal systems on 11 July and published two days later. By its sixth report the count was about 290,000 people, including job applicants, staff and accident counterparties, with My Number, driver’s licence, bank and health data for some.
  • An incident at Nichirei’s logistics business left KFC Japan with stock-outs and a shorter menu. No KFC customer data was involved. A supplier breach can empty the shelves as well as leak a list.
  • Media4u, which runs the Aurora SMS CONSOLE text-messaging service, had an account-management file taken and 280 unauthorized text messages sent from its platform.
  • Card-skimming code on payment pages surfaced at two online shops. At Fine the tampering traces back to November 2017. At Ink Kakumei, run by C-Connect, 24,166 people’s card details were at risk; the shop found out in December 2025 and published in July.

How attackers got in

The route is stated for 21 of 56 (37.5%) of the month’s distinct breaches. 35 of 56 (62.5%) say “unauthorized access” and nothing more. The shares below use only the 21 that state a route, so treat them as a sketch.

Route, in plain English Distinct breaches Closest MITRE ATT&CK technique
Ransomware: files encrypted, often with data taken first 9 of 21 (42.9%) Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486), which describes the damage, not the way in
Misused account: stolen or guessed passwords, hijacked email or admin accounts 7 of 21 (33.3%) Valid Accounts (T1078)
Flaw in an internet-facing system or app: an unpatched or vulnerable website, server, plugin or programming interface (API) 2 of 21 (9.5%) Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190)
Other: malware on a contractor’s computer, payment fraud, supplier outages 3 of 21 (14.3%) Varies

MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of attacker techniques that security teams use as a shared vocabulary. Supplier breaches take the route stated in the supplier’s own notice.

By distinct breaches, ransomware leads, then misused accounts. The two skimming cases are not in the table: their notices say the payment page was tampered with but not how the attacker got in, so they count as “not stated”. That is a fair picture of July overall: the damage is described, the way in mostly is not.

What’s affected

51 of 72 (70.8%) notices list at least one type of data. The shares below use those 51 as the base.

Data type Notices Share
Email addresses 22 22 of 51 (43.1%)
Names 26 26 of 51 (51.0%)
Phone numbers 20 20 of 51 (39.2%)
Postal addresses 22 22 of 51 (43.1%)
Date of birth 3 3 of 51 (5.9%)
Passwords (hashed or not) 15 15 of 51 (29.4%)
Payment card data (including partial numbers) 2 2 of 51 (3.9%)

Data types are matched on the wording of each notice, and a notice that says “no card data” is not counted as card data. Passwords use the tracker’s own password flag.

Contact details lead again. The password share is high this month because the student-PC shop and the salon booking system both held encrypted passwords. “Encrypted” is better than plain text, but the right word for passwords is “hashed”, and notices rarely say which.

Records

July’s deduplicated total is 41,573,205. Notices whose figures already sit inside a supplier’s own total are left out: 15 of 72 (20.8%). That way each supplier breach counts once. Of the 57 that remain, 23 of 57 (40.4%) give a number.

The unit is the catch. Notices count email addresses, people, accounts or simply “records”, and the same person can appear in many of them. Read this as the sum of headline figures, not as a count of people.

Unit stated Records Share of total
Records, unit unspecified 41,022,829 98.7%
People 549,455 1.3%
Card details 912 0.0%
Accounts and form submissions 9 0.0%

One breach carries the month. EPARK’s 33,000,000 records are 79.4% of the total, and Murauchi.com’s 7,716,811 another 18.6%. The top five make up 99.3%. The median notice with a figure is 10,157.

Organisation Headline figure Breached
EPARK Relax & Esthe (PeakManager) About 33,000,000 records (22.18 million people) Supplier’s own systems
Murauchi.com 7,716,811 records Own systems
Nihon Kotsu About 290,000 people Own systems
Kaga Solnet (Academico Navi) 165,587 people Supplier’s own systems
Media4u (Aurora SMS CONSOLE) 95,412 records Supplier’s own systems

Disclosure speed

Only notices with an exact discovery date and an exact disclosure date are used: 30 of 72 (41.7%). Discovery here means when the organisation says it found out, which for a supplier’s customer is often when the supplier told it.

Group Notices with both dates Median days, discovery to disclosure Disclosed within 7 days
All 30 7.5 15 of 30 (50.0%)
Own systems 21 8 10 of 21 (47.6%)
Through a supplier 5 24 2 of 5 (40.0%)
Supplier’s own notice 4 5.5 3 of 4 (75.0%)

The sample is small, so read this loosely. 2 of 30 (6.7%) disclosed on the day they found out, and 6 of 30 (20.0%) took more than 30 days. The slowest was 232 days, at the card-skimmed ink shop. Supplier customers were slow this month, a median of 24 days across only 5 notices with both dates. Two of those waited months: 132 days at Murata Land & Building and 81 at Fukuoka University.

Detection was slower still. The Fine skimming code had been in place since 2017.

Sectors two ways

Counting notices and counting breaches give different pictures. The second column counts breaches of the organisation’s own systems, including suppliers that announced breaches of their own systems (48 in July).

Sector Notices Own-system breaches
Education / research 18 of 72 (25.0%) 6 of 48 (12.5%)
Retail / e-commerce 12 of 72 (16.7%) 9 of 48 (18.8%)
Manufacturing / construction / utilities 9 of 72 (12.5%) 7 of 48 (14.6%)
IT / internet / software services 7 of 72 (9.7%) 7 of 48 (14.6%)
Other 7 of 72 (9.7%) 7 of 48 (14.6%)
Media / entertainment 5 of 72 (6.9%) 4 of 48 (8.3%)
Government / public sector 4 of 72 (5.6%) 0 of 48 (0.0%)
Healthcare / pharma 3 of 72 (4.2%) 3 of 48 (6.2%)
Transport / logistics 3 of 72 (4.2%) 3 of 48 (6.2%)
Finance / insurance 2 of 72 (2.8%) 1 of 48 (2.1%)
Restaurant / food service 2 of 72 (2.8%) 1 of 48 (2.1%)

Education tops the notice count with 18 of 72 (25.0%), and 11 of 18 (61.1%) of those came through the student-PC shop. By own-system breaches, retail leads with 9 of 48 (18.8%).

Outside counts

The Personal Information Protection Commission (PPC) received 212 initial reports of personal-data leaks from unauthorized access in July, up from 185 in June. Its count rose while the tracker’s fell, a reminder that the two measure different things: the PPC counts reports filed with it, including many that never become a public notice, and leaves out financial and telecom firms and public bodies.

Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR), which counts only listed companies and their subsidiaries, says its monthly count stayed in the teens until September.

One practical tip

When you stop using a supplier, ask it in writing to delete your data and to confirm when it has. Put a named person in charge of chasing the reply. Lind Sports’ 2014 customer list was still sitting with a fax-service company it had left, and that is the cheapest kind of breach to prevent.

Do the same at renewal for suppliers you keep: ask what of yours they still hold, and whether they need it.

30, 60 and 90 days

Review every supplier that touches personal data, current and former. Keep the ones that are necessary, and bring the rest in-house or drop them, with deletion confirmed. Fewer suppliers holding less data means fewer places to leak from and less to manage: operational efficiency as well as lower risk.

When Action Owner Done when
30 days List every supplier that holds or has held your personal data in the last five years, with a named internal owner for each. Head of IT or security, with procurement One list, including former suppliers.
60 days Ask every former supplier to delete your data and confirm in writing. Decide keep, bring in-house or drop for current ones. Named supplier owners, with legal Every former supplier has confirmed deletion or is escalated.
90 days Add exit clauses to supplier contracts: deletion on termination, with written confirmation within a set number of days. Legal and procurement Clause in all critical contracts; the rest at renewal.

What remains unknown

  • How most attackers got in. 35 of 56 breaches (62.5%) do not say.
  • How many people were really affected. Units are mixed, and 34 of the 57 counted notices (59.6%) give no number.
  • How many former suppliers still hold old data. Notices only appear after a breach.
  • How complete July is. These rows were added later, so small notices may be missing.

How we counted

Each row of the Japan Cybersecurity Tracker is one organisation’s published notice about a cyber incident in Japan. This briefing uses rows whose disclosure date falls between 1 and 31 July 2026, from the snapshot of 16 November 2026. The June to September rows were mostly added after the fact, in a backfill, so small notices that never reached the press are more likely to be missing than in later months.

  • Included: incidents disclosed by the organisation itself, or a supplier’s notice confirmed by the customer’s own notice. Hijacked email and admin accounts count even when no leak is confirmed.
  • Not included: ransomware gangs’ claims on the dark web without a notice, lost USB sticks and other physical losses, and precautionary shutdowns with no incident.
  • “No leak confirmed” is recorded as stated. It is not read as “no leak”.
  • Supplier links: of the 24 notices through a supplier, 21 (87.5%) name the supplier and 3 (12.5%) do not name one.
  • Distinct breaches: notices are collapsed to the parent breached supplier named in the data. Own-system incidents and unnamed-supplier notices count one each, so the distinct count is an upper bound.
  • Records: the headline or maximum figure each notice gives, including later revisions. Blank stays blank, not zero. Figures already inside a supplier’s total are excluded from the sum.
  • Dates: notices are placed by disclosure date. 13 tracker rows have no exact disclosure date. None of them is placed in this month, and they are left out of every monthly figure.
  • Limits: categories come from the wording of notices, much of it translated from Japanese. The data is a snapshot and changes as reports are revised.

The full row-level dataset is available on request through the dataset page, which also explains the method and how to cite it.

If you need any help, don’t hesitate to get in touch.

Matt Ketchum